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Abstract
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) establishes the equiva-
lence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the
decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods
economies as in Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) as well as private goods economies. For private
goods economies we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral
monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check domain conditions which separately guaran-
tee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii)
strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and dis-
cuss various classical single-peaked domains and show which of the domain conditions they
satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis,
we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3.
We also discuss some new “Muller-Satterthwaite domains” (e.g., Proposition 3).
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11 Introduction
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) states the equivalence between
strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of
(social choice) rules.1 As a consequence of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem, the class of Maskin
monotonic rules is fairly small: only dictatorial rules are strategy-proof.2 However, it is by now well-
understood that the aforementioned theorem strongly relies on the assumption of an unrestricted
domain of strict preferences –what we refer to as the Arrovian domain. In many situations though, it
is natural to work with more structured preference domains. For instance, consider a group of agents
who have to choose the location of a public facility on their street. A natural domain restriction
is to assume that agents have single-peaked preferences over the possible locations (Black, 1948).
We know that the class of strategy-proof rules for this type of economies is large (Moulin, 1980);
and a natural question is whether the same conclusion holds for the class of Maskin monotonic
rules. So, despite the equivalence provided by the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem, it seems that
for many domains and models of interest, the logical relation between Maskin monotonicity and
strategy-proofness is not fully understood. In addition, notice that in public goods models, a rule
selects an alternative at each preference proﬁle, whereas in private goods models, an allocation will
be selected –i.e., a bundle for each agent. An allocation is an object whose nature is diﬀerent from
an alternative in several aspects. For instance, the bundle that an agent (or a group of agents)
receives at some preference proﬁle may be conditional on the shape of preferences of some other
agents. Rules that have this feature violate the well-known non-bossiness condition (Satterthwaite
and Sonnenschein, 1981). Because of this diﬀerence between the two models, it is not clear whether
there is a “direct” logical relation between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness in private
goods models.
Our contribution: Our goal is to provide a better understanding of the logical relation between
monotonicity conditions and strategy-proofness. We consider a model that covers public goods
as well as private goods economies.3 In addition to Maskin monotonicity, we introduce a weaker
condition called unilateral monotonicity which pertains to unilateral changes in preferences.4 The
use of this condition is pertinent when we refer to private goods models.
We introduce two easy-to-check domain conditions. Condition R1 is a domain richness condi-
tion, whereas Condition R2 is a domain restriction condition. A rule deﬁned on a domain satisfying
1Both conditions are central in the mechanism design literature. Strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for
implementation in dominant strategies, whereas Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for implementation in
Nash equilibrium.
2The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem has as well-known corollary the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard,
1973; Satterthwaite, 1975): any eﬃcient and strategy-proof rule deﬁned on a domain of unrestricted linear orderings
must be dictatorial.
3For private goods economies, our model covers both the inﬁnitely divisible goods case as well as the indivisible
goods case.
4As far as we know, unilateral monotonicity was ﬁrst introduced by Takamiya (2001).
2Condition R1 is unilaterally monotonic/Maskin monotonic if it is strategy-proof (Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1). Examples of rich domains include the Arrovian domain as well as various single-peaked
(single-plateaued) domains, but exclude domains in which preferences are both single-peaked and
symmetric. More generally, the domain of convex star-shaped preferences satisﬁes Condition R1
(Proposition 1). Next, for public goods models, Condition R2 entails that strategy-proofness implies
Maskin monotonicity; and for private goods models, strategy-proofness implies unilateral mono-
tonicity (Theorem 2). Indeed, in private goods models, there exist rules that are strategy-proof but
not Maskin monotonic. As argued above, an important diﬀerence between public goods and private
goods models turns out to be the existence of rules that violate non-bossiness in the latter.5 As a
consequence, for several domains, the “set-inclusion connection” between the class of Maskin mono-
tonic rules and the class of strategy proof rules may be lost for private goods models.6 However,
when Condition R2 is satisﬁed, a logical relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin mono-
tonicity can be recovered thanks to non-bossiness: strategy-proofness and non-bossiness together
imply Maskin monotonicity (Corollary 2). Examples of domains satisfying Condition R2 include
the Arrovian domain as well as some (symmetric) single-peaked (single-plateaued) preference do-
mains but exclude larger domains like the single-peaked preference domain.7 More generally, any
convex norm induced preference domain satisﬁes Condition R2 (Proposition 2).
Next we come to the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem and its extensions. As a by-product of our
results, we obtain an extended version of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem that applies to the
model at hand (Theorem 3). A straightforward corollary is the standard version of the theorem
(Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) for the public goods case, along with a new and direct proof.
We then discuss some new “Muller-Satterthwaite domains” of interest (Proposition 3). This shows
that the conclusion of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem can also spread to restricted domains.
Relation to the literature: The investigation of the relation between monotonicity conditions
and strategy-proofness is not new. A seminal paper dealing with the relation between Maskin
monotonicity and strategy-proofness is Dasgupta et al. (1979). They introduce a domain richness
condition and prove that any Maskin monotonic rule deﬁned on a rich domain is strategy-proof.
More recently, Takamiya (2001, 2003) studies the relation between coalition strategy-proofness
and Maskin monotonicity for a broad class of economies with indivisible goods. Takamiya (2007)
generalizes the results obtained in his former two papers. Finally, in a paper independent of ours,
Berga and Moreno (2009) study the relation between strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, and
non-bossiness for the single-peaked and single-plateaued domain for the provision of a pure public
good.
5For preference domains satisfying Condition R2, unilateral monotonicity and non-bossiness imply Maskin mono-
tonicity (Lemma 1).
6For example, in private goods models, the symmetric single-peaked domain admits rules that are strategy-proof
but not Maskin monotonic, as well as rules that are Maskin monotonic but not strategy-proof.
7However, the domain of strict single-peaked preferences satisﬁes Condition R2. In fact, any domain composed
only of strict preference relations satisﬁes Condition R2.
3In addition to Dasgupta et al. (1979), domain richness conditions are used in papers close
to ours, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) and Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2009). Note that the
richness condition (Condition R1) that we introduce diﬀers from the conditions uncovered in the
aforementioned papers, and it does not imply any “cross-proﬁle” requirements. We discuss in the
Appendix the logical relations between the latter conditions and our Condition R1.
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we introduce a general model that en-
compasses public goods as well as private goods economies, and we present the deﬁnitions and
preference domains necessary for the paper. In Section 3, we deﬁne our two domain conditions and
we prove our main results. In Section 4 we check both these conditions for well-known preference
domains. We also provide an extended version of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem that applies to
the model at hand. Finally, in the Appendix, we compare our domain richness condition (Condition
R1) to the ones introduced in related papers.
2 The Model, Key Properties, and Preference Domains
2.1 The Model
Let N = {1,...,n} be a set of agents. Let A = A1 × ... × An be a set of alternatives. We assume
that for all i,j ∈ N, Ai = Aj. Furthermore, we assume that if Ai ⊆ Rm and |Ai| = ∞, then Ai is
convex. Let x = (x1,...,xn) ∈ A be an alternative and
1 ≡ (1,...,1) ∈ Rn. If alternative x is such
that for all i,j ∈ N, xi = xj = α, then we denote x = α
1. Next, let F ⊆ A be the set of feasible
alternatives. If for all x ∈ F there exists α such that x = α
1, then the set of feasible alternatives
models a public goods economy. Otherwise, we model an economy with at least one private goods
component. Hence, our model encompasses public and private goods economies.
To ﬁx ideas, let us give two examples. It will be clear from these examples that given the set
A of alternatives, the set F of feasible alternatives fully determines whether we are working with
a public or a private goods model. Note that the Cartesian product notation we use for the set of
alternatives is for notational convenience only; none of our results require it.
Example 1. Let A = {a1,...,an} × ... × {a1,...,an}. Suppose that the agents have to choose
one candidate out of the set {a1,...,an} of possible candidates. Then, F = {x ∈ A : for all i,j ∈
N, xi = xj}. On the other hand, if agents have to allocate the set of indivisible objects or tasks
{a1,...,an} among themselves, then F = {x ∈ A : for all i,j ∈ N, xi  = xj}. ⋄
Example 2. Let A = [0,1] × ... × [0,1]. Suppose that the agents have to choose a single point in
the interval [0,1] that everyone will consume without rivalry, e.g., a public facility on a street (see
Moulin, 1980). Then, F = {x ∈ A : for all i,j ∈ N, xi = xj}. On the other hand, if agents have to
choose a division of one unit of an inﬁnitely divisible good among themselves (see Sprumont, 1991),
4then feasibility is determined by the size of the resource and F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N, xi ≥
0 and
P
i∈N xi = 1}. ⋄
For all i ∈ N, preferences are represented by a complete, reﬂexive, and transitive binary relation
Ri over Ai. As usual, for all x,y ∈ A, xi Ri yi is interpreted as “i weakly prefers x to y”, xi Pi yi as
“i strictly prefers x to y”, and xi Ii yi as “i is indiﬀerent between x and y”. Whenever our model
captures a private goods component, we assume that agents only care about their own consumption.
Therefore, for several of our results, we use both notations x Ri y and xi Ri yi. This is done for
convenience only and it should cause no confusion.
For all i ∈ N, let Ri = R be a set of preferences on Ai. Thus, we assume that all agents have
the same preference domain R. Let RN denote the set of preference proﬁles R = (Ri)i∈N such that
for all i ∈ N, Ri ∈ R.
For all i ∈ N, all preference relations Ri ∈ R, and all alternatives x ∈ A, the lower contour set
of Ri at x is L(Ri,x) ≡ {y ∈ A : xRiy}; the strict lower contour set of Ri at x is SL(Ri,x) ≡ {y ∈
A : x Pi y}; the upper contour set of Ri at x is U(Ri,x) ≡ {y ∈ A : y Ri x}; and the strict upper
contour set of Ri at x is SU(Ri,x) ≡ {y ∈ A : y Pi x}.
Let A, F, and R be given. Then, a rule ϕ is a function that assigns to every preference proﬁle
R ∈ RN a feasible alternative ϕ(R) ∈ F.
2.2 Properties of Rules
We discuss in turn two central properties of the mechanism design literature. First, strategy-
proofness is an incentive property which requires that no agent ever beneﬁts from misrepresenting
his preference relation. In game theoretical terms, a rule is strategy-proof if in its associated
direct revelation game form, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true
preference relation. By the revelation principle, strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for
dominant strategy implementability.
For agent i ∈ N, preference proﬁle R ∈ RN, and preference relation R′
i ∈ R, we obtain
preference proﬁle (R′
i,R−i) by replacing Ri at R by R′
i.




Next, Maskin monotonicity is a property which requires the robustness (or invariance) of a rule
with respect to speciﬁc preference changes. A rule ϕ is Maskin monotonic if an alternative x that
is chosen at preference proﬁle R remains chosen at a preference proﬁle R′ at which x is considered
(weakly) better by all agents. An important result of the mechanism design literature is that Maskin
monotonicity is a necessary condition for Nash implementability of a rule (see Maskin, 1977, 1999).
Apart from its importance for Nash implementability, we consider Maskin monotonicity to be an
appealing property in itself.
5In order to introduce Maskin monotonicity, we ﬁrst deﬁne monotonic transformations. Loosely
speaking, for any alternative x and any preference proﬁle R, if at a preference proﬁle R′ all agents
i ∈ N consider alternative x to be (weakly) better, then R′ is a monotonic transformation of R
at x. For preferences Ri,R′
i ∈ R and alternative x ∈ A, R′
i is a monotonic transformation of Ri
at x if L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x). By MT(Ri,x) we denote the set of all monotonic transformations
of Ri at x and by MT(R,x) we denote the set of all monotonic transformations of R at x, i.e.,
R′ ∈ MT(R,x) if for all i ∈ N, R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x).
Maskin Monotonicity: A rule ϕ is Maskin monotonic if for all R,R′ ∈ RN, ϕ(R) = x and
R′ ∈ MT(R,x) imply ϕ(R′) = x.
For one of our “private goods results” we use the following weaker monotonicity property: a
rule ϕ is unilaterally Maskin monotonic if given that alternative x is chosen at preference proﬁle
R, agent i’s component xi remains chosen at a unilateral deviation proﬁle R′ = (R′
i,R−i) at which
agent i considers xi to be (weakly) better.
Unilateral Monotonicity: A rule ϕ is unilaterally monotonic if for all R ∈ RN, all i ∈ N, and
all R′
i ∈ R, ϕ(R) = x and R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x) imply ϕi(R′
i,R−i) = xi.
Note that Maskin monotonicity implies unilateral monotonicity. To be more precise, for public
goods economies, Maskin monotonicity and unilateral monotonicity are equivalent and for private
goods economies Maskin monotonicity implies unilateral monotonicity.
We close this section by introducing non-bossiness (in allocations) (see Satterthwaite and Son-
nenschein, 1981), an auxiliary property that we use for some of our “private goods results”. The
property states that by changing his preference relation, an agent cannot change components of
the allocation for the other agents without aﬀecting his own. Obviously, this property is vacuous
in a public goods model.
Non-Bossiness: A rule ϕ is non-bossy if for all R ∈ RN, all i ∈ N, and all R′
i ∈ R, ϕi(R) =
ϕi(R′
i,R−i) implies that ϕ(R) = ϕ(R′
i,R−i).
For private goods models, Maskin monotonicity implies non-bossiness under our richness domain
condition (Condition R1), while the converse is not true. On the other hand, the conjunction
of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity under our domain
restriction condition (Condition R2). These relations will be made clear in Section 3.
2.3 Well-Known Preference Domains
2.3.1 The Arrovian Domain
We refer to the unrestricted domain of strict preferences RA as the Arrovian domain, i.e., RA is
such that for all i ∈ N, all Ri ∈ R, and all xi,yi ∈ Ai, xi Ri yi implies xi Pi yi or xi = yi.
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Figure 1: Set-relationships between one-dimensional single-peaked domains
2.3.2 One-Dimensional Single-Peaked and Single-Plateaued Preferences
Here we introduce the general single-peaked preference domain and several of its well-known sub-
domains. We start by deﬁning the smallest domain we consider, the symmetric single-peaked pref-
erence domain introduced in Border and Jordan (1983). The domain of symmetric single-peaked
preferences is induced by the Euclidean norm    E.
Symmetric Single-Peaked (Euclidean) Preferences on R: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ R are
symmetrically single-peaked (or Euclidean) if there exists a point p(Ri) ∈ Ai such that for all
xi,yi ∈ Ai, xi Ri yi if and only if  p(Ri) − xi E ≤  p(Ri) − yi E.
By relaxing the symmetry assumption, one obtains the domain of single-peaked preferences
introduced in Black (1948) and Moulin (1980).
Single-Peaked Preferences on R: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ R are single-peaked if there exists a
point p(Ri) ∈ Ai such that for all xi,yi ∈ Ai satisfying either yi < xi ≤ p(Ri) or p(Ri) ≤ xi < yi,
xi Pi yi.
We now introduce two superdomains of the single-peaked preference domain. First, consider
again the location of a public facility on a street. As in Example 2, we assume that agents’
preferences are single-peaked, but that in addition they have an outside option so that if the public
facility is too far away, they will not use it. This class of preferences is introduced and analyzed by
Cantala (2004). Here we give an ordinal representation of Cantala’s (2004) class of preferences.
Single-Peaked Preferences on R with an Outside Option: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ R are
single-peaked with an outside option if there exists an interval [a,b] ⊆ Ai and a point p(Ri) ∈ (a,b)
such that (i) Ri is single-peaked on [a,b]; (ii) for all xi ∈ (a,b) and yi ∈ Ai \[a,b], xi Pi yi; and (iii)
for all xi,yi ∈ Ai \ (a,b), xi Ii yi.
The second superdomain of the single-peaked domain frequently encountered in the literature
(see Moulin, 1984) is the so-called single-plateaued domain. For such a domain, we allow agents to
have an interval of best points, so that instead of the peak we have a plateau.
7Single-Plateaued Preferences on R: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ R are single-plateaued if there
exists an interval [p(Ri),p(Ri)] ⊆ Ai such that (i) for all xi,yi ∈ [p(Ri),p(Ri)], xi Ii yi; (ii) for all
xi ∈ [p(Ri),p(Ri)] and all yi ∈ Ai \[p(Ri),p(Ri)], xi Pi yi; and (iii) for all xi,yi ∈ Ai \[p(Ri),p(Ri)]
satisfying either yi < xi ≤ p(Ri) or p(Ri) ≤ xi < yi, xi Pi yi.
Note that the deﬁnition above only allows for a unique plateau of best alternatives. Dasgupta,
Hammond, and Maskin (1979), DHM for short, consider a more general single-plateaued domain
(which they call the single-peaked domain) by allowing for additional plateaus left and right from
the “top-plateau”.
DHM Single-Plateaued Preferences on R: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ R are DHM single-plateaued
if there exists an interval [p(Ri),p(Ri)] ⊆ Ai such that (i) for all xi,yi ∈ [p(Ri),p(Ri)], xiIiyi; (ii) for
all xi ∈ [p(Ri),p(Ri)] and all yi ∈ Ai\[p(Ri),p(Ri)], xiPiyi; and (iii) for all xi,yi ∈ Ai\[p(Ri),p(Ri)]
satisfying either yi < xi ≤ p(Ri) or p(Ri) ≤ xi < yi, then xi Ri yi.
2.3.3 Higher-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
There are various extensions of the one-dimensional single-peaked domains to higher dimensions.
We start again by deﬁning the smallest domains ﬁrst. The ﬁrst two domains are extensions of the
one-dimensional symmetric single-peaked preferences introduced before (see Border and Jordan,
1983).
Symmetric Single-Peaked (Euclidean) Preferences on Rm: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ Rm
are symmetrically single-peaked (or Euclidean) if there exists a point p(Ri) ∈ Ai such that for all
xi,yi ∈ Ai, xi Ri yi if and only if  p(Ri) − xi E ≤  p(Ri) − yi E.
Note that for symmetric single-peaked preferences, upper contour sets are spheres. The following
domain loosely speaking extends the symmetric preference domain to also allow for ellipsoids as
upper contour sets (with axes that are parallel to the coordinate axes).
Separable Quadratic Preferences on Rm: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ Rm are separable quadratic
if there exists a point p(Ri) ∈ Ai, α1,...,αn > 0, and a utility representation ui of Ri such that
for all xi ∈ Ai, ui(xi) = −
Pm
k=1 (αk(xi,k − pk(Ri))
2. Note that if for all i,j ∈ N, αi = αj, then
preferences are symmetric.
In order to introduce the next domain, we need some deﬁnitions and notation. We deﬁne the con-
vex hull of two points xi,yi ∈ Rm by conv(xi,yi) = {zi ∈ Rm : there exists t ∈ [0,1] such that zi =
txi + (1 − t)yi}. Let       be a strictly convex norm, i.e.,
8(i) for all xi ∈ Rm,  xi  ≥ 0, (positivity)
(ii) for all xi ∈ Rm,  xi  = 0 if and only if xi = 0, (positive deﬁniteness)
(iii) for all xi ∈ Rm and α ∈ R,  αxi  = |α| xi , (positive homogeneity)
(iv) for all xi,yi ∈ Rm,  xi  +  yi  ≥  xi + yi , (triangular inequality)
(v) for all xi,yi,zi ∈ Rm, (strict convexity)
 xi − yi  +  yi − zi  =  xi − zi  if and only if yi ∈ conv(xi,zi).
Note that the requirement of strict convexity means that any sphere of positive radius does not
contain any line segment that is not reduced to a point. Our deﬁnition of strict convexity for norms
is based on Papadopoulos (2005, Proposition 7.2.1), which also lists various equivalent conditions
for the strict convexity of a norm. For instance, the so-called ℓp norm    p on Rm is strictly convex
for any p > 1 (see Papadopoulos, 2005, Proposition 7.3.2).8
The following domain includes the two previously introduced domains.
Preferences on Rm that are Induced by a Strictly Convex Norm      : Preferences Ri on
Ai ⊆ Rm are induced by a strictly convex norm     if there exists a point p(Ri) ∈ Ai such that for
all xi,yi ∈ Ai, xi Ri yi if and only if  p(Ri) − xi  ≤  p(Ri) − yi .
Finally, we introduce the most general higher-dimensional single-peaked domain that we are
aware of (see Border and Jordan, 1983).
Star-Shaped Preferences on Rm: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ Rm are star-shaped if there exists a
point p(Ri) ∈ Ai such that for all xi ∈ Ai\{p(Ri)} and all λ ∈ (0,1), p(Ri)Pi[λxi+(1−λ)p(Ri)]Pixi.
If in addition to star-shapedness we require convexity of preferences, we obtain the following
class of preferences.9
Convex Star-Shaped Preferences on Rm: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ Rm are convex star-shaped
if they are star-shaped and for all x ∈ A, U(Ri,x) is a convex set.
3 Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness
3.1 Rich Domains: Monotonicity implies Strategy-Proofness
For i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R, by b(Ri) we denote agent i’s best alternatives in A, i.e., b(Ri) ≡ {x ∈ A :
for all y ∈ A, x Ri y}. To establish our ﬁrst result, we introduce the following domain “richness”
condition.
8For p > 1 and x ∈ R





9Preferences Ri on Ai are convex if for all xi,yi ∈ Ai and λ ∈ [0,1], xi Ri yi implies λxi + (1 − λ)yi Ri yi.
9Condition R1: Let i ∈ N, Ri ∈ R, and x,y ∈ A be such that y Pi x. Then, there exists R′
i ∈ R
such that y ∈ b(R′
i) and L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x).10
Remark 1. Note that Condition R1 is diﬀerent from Dasgupta et al.’s (1979) or Fleurbaey and
Maniquet’s (1997) richness conditions. Our condition involves one preference relation Ri while the
other two richness conditions are based on conditions involving two preference relations Ri and R′
i.
The domain richness condition closest to ours seems to be the one introduced by Le Breton and
Zaporozhets (2009). We brieﬂy state and discuss the relation between these richness conditions in
more detail in Appendix A. △
Examples of rich domains satisfying Condition R1 are the Arrovian domain, the single-peaked
preference domain on R, and more generally the convex star-shaped preference domain on Rm (see
Proposition 1). We will check if the domains introduced above satisfy Condition R1 in Section 4
and give a short survey in Table 1.
Theorem 1. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R1 and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN.
If ϕ is unilaterally monotonic, then it is strategy-proof.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is unilaterally monotonic, but not strategy-proof. Then, there exist R ∈ RN,
i ∈ N, and ¯ Ri ∈ R such that ϕ( ¯ Ri,R−i) Pi ϕ(R). Denote ϕ(R) = x and ϕ( ¯ Ri,R−i) = y. Hence,
yi Pi xi and by Condition R1 there exists R′
i ∈ R such that y ∈ b(R′
i) and L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x).
Thus, R′
i ∈ MT( ¯ Ri,y) and R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x). By unilateral monotonicity, ϕi(R′
i,R−i) = yi and
ϕi(R′
i,R−i) = xi. Hence, xi = yi; contradicting our assumption that yi Pi xi.
Corollary 1. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R1 and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN.
If ϕ is Maskin monotonic, then it is strategy-proof.
We demonstrate for the public as well as for the private goods case that strategy-proofness does
not necessarily imply unilateral/Maskin monotonicity. For both examples, we use the domain of
single-peaked preferences, which satisﬁes Condition R1 (this follows from Proposition 1).
Example 3. We consider Moulin’s (1980) model as introduced in Example 2. Thus, for all i ∈
N,Ai = [0,1] and agents’ preferences are single-peaked on R. Let c1,c2 ∈ [0,1], c1 < c2, and k ∈ N.




1 if c1 Pk c2 or if c1 Ik c2 and p(Rk) ∈ Q;
c2
1 if c2 Pk c1 or if c1 Ik c2 and p(Rk)  ∈ Q.
It is easy to see that ϕ is strategy-proof, but not unilateral/Maskin monotonic. ⋄
10Note that in the proof of Theorem 1 and in all results concerning single-peaked domains, we could strengthen
Condition R1 by requiring L(Ri,x) = L(R
′
i,x) instead of L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R
′
i,x).
10Example 4. We consider Sprumont’s (1991) model as introduced in Example 2. Thus, for all i ∈ N,
Ai = [0,1] and F = {x ∈ A : for all i ∈ N, xi ≥ 0 and
P
i∈N xi = 1}. Note that in this model,
a two agents division problem corresponds to a two agents location problem in Moulin’s (1980)
model. Hence, by adapting the rule of Example 3, we can construct a strategy-proof rule ϕ′ that
is not unilaterally/Maskin monotonic for Sprumont’s (1991) model as follows. Let c1,c2 ∈ [0,1],
c1 < c2, k ∈ N, and ϕ be the rule deﬁned in Example 3. Let j ∈ N \ {k}. Then for all R ∈ RN,
ϕ′
k(R) = ϕk(R), ϕ′
j(R) = 1 − ϕk(R), and for all i ∈ N \ {j,k}, ϕ′
i(R) = 0. ⋄
3.2 Restricted Domains: Strategy-Proofness implies Monotonicity
To establish our second result, we introduce the following domain “restriction” condition.
Condition R2: Let i ∈ N, Ri,R′
i ∈ R, and x ∈ A be such that R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x) and R′
i  = Ri.
Then, for all y ∈ L(Ri,x) ∩ U(R′
i,x), yi = xi.
Examples of restricted domains satisfying Condition R2 are the Arrovian domain (and any
domain containing only strict preference relations), the symmetric single-peaked preference domain
on R, the separable quadratic preference domain on Rm, and more generally any strictly convex
norm induced preference domain (see Proposition 2). We will check if the domains introduced
above satisfy Condition R2 in Section 4 and give a short survey in Table 1.
Theorem 2. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R2 and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN.
(a) If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is unilaterally monotonic.
(b) Let F determine a public goods economy. If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is Maskin monotonic.
Proof. (a) Suppose ϕ is strategy-proof, but not unilaterally monotonic. Then, there exist R ∈ RN,
i ∈ N, and R′
i ∈ R such that ϕ(R) = x, R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x), and ϕi(R′
i,R−i) = yi  = xi. By strategy-
proofness, x Ri y and y R′
i x. Thus, y ∈ L(Ri,x) and y ∈ U(R′
i,x). Hence, y ∈ L(Ri,x) ∩ U(R′
i,x)
and yi  = xi; a contradiction with Condition R2.
(b) Next, assume that F determines a public goods economy and suppose ϕ is strategy-proof,
but not Maskin monotonic. Then, there exist R,R′ ∈ RN such that R′ ∈ MT(R,x), ϕ(R) = x
and ϕ(R′) = y  = x. Assume that R′ = (R′
i,R−i) for some i ∈ N. By strategy-proofness, x Ri y
and y R′
i x. Thus, y ∈ L(Ri,x) and y ∈ U(R′
i,x). By the public goods assumption, xi  = yi. Hence,
y ∈ L(Ri,x)∩U(R′
i,x) and yi  = xi; a contradiction with Condition R2. Hence, ϕ(R) = ϕ(R′). The
proof that for all R,R′ ∈ RN such that R′ ∈ MT(R,x), ϕ(R) = ϕ(R′) follows from an iteration of
the previous arguments (by switching agents one by one from Ri to R′
i).
We demonstrate for the public as well as for the private goods case that unilateral/Maskin
monotonicity does not necessarily imply strategy-proofness. For both examples, we use the domain
of symmetric single-peaked preferences, which satisﬁes Condition R2 (this follows from Proposi-
tion 2).
11Example 5. We consider Moulin’s (1980) model as described in Examples 2 and 3, but with




1 if p(Rk) ≤ c1;
c2
1 otherwise.
It is easy to see that ϕ is unilaterally/Maskin monotonic, but not strategy-proof. ⋄
Example 6. We consider Sprumont’s (1991) model discussed in Examples 2 and 4, but with
symmetric single-peaked preferences. Similarly as in Example 4, we can adapt the rule of Example 5
to construct a unilaterally/Maskin monotonic rule ϕ′ that is not strategy-proof. Let c1,c2 ∈ [0,1],
c1 < c2, k ∈ N, and ϕ be the rule deﬁned in Example 5. Let j ∈ N \ {k}. Then for all R ∈ RN,
ϕ′
k(R) = ϕk(R), ϕ′
j(R) = 1 − ϕk(R), and for all i ∈ N \ {j,k}, ϕ′
i(R) = 0. ⋄
The following example demonstrates that for private goods economies Condition R2 and
strategy-proofness do not necessarily imply Maskin monotonicity (hence, Theorem 2 (b) cannot
be extended to private goods economies). We use the domain of separable quadratic single-peaked
preferences, which satisﬁes Condition R2 (this follows from Proposition 2).
Example 7. We consider a two-dimensional extension of Sprumont’s (1991) model with separable




i∈N xi = 1
1}. Without loss of generality let N = {1,2,3}. Let c ∈ [0,1)2. We deﬁne ϕ
as follows. First, for all R ∈ RN, ϕ1(R) = c. Second, if R1 is symmetric, then ϕ2(R) = 1
1 − c and
ϕ3(R) = 0, and otherwise, ϕ2(R) = 0 and ϕ3(R) = 1
1−c. It is easy to see that ϕ is strategy-proof,
unilaterally monotonic, but not Maskin monotonic. ⋄
Theorem 2 as well as Examples 6 and 7 show an important diﬀerence between public goods
and private goods models. For the former, and for almost all the domains we cover11, the class of
Maskin monotonic rules is either a subset, a superset, or coincides with the class of strategy-proof
rules (see Table 1). In the private goods case, this “set-inclusion connection” between the class
of Maskin monotonic rules and the class of strategy-proof rules is lost for some domains, e.g., the
symmetric single-peaked domain for which there exist rules that are Maskin monotonic but not
strategy-proof, as well as rules that are strategy-proof but not Maskin monotonic.
A key feature of Example 7 is that ϕ violates non-bossiness. With the next lemma we can show
easily that Theorem 2 (b) can be extended to private goods economies if non-bossiness is added.
Lemma 1. Let A and F be given. Let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN. If ϕ is unilaterally monotonic
and non-bossy, then it is Maskin monotonic.
11Exception made of the star-shaped domain.
12Proof. Suppose that ϕ is unilaterally monotonic and non-bossy. Let R ∈ RN, i ∈ N, and R′
i ∈ R
be such that ϕ(R) = x and R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x). Then, by unilateral monotonicity, ϕi(R′
i,R−i) = xi.
Hence, by non-bossiness, ϕ(R′
i,R−i) = x. The proof that for all R,R′ ∈ RN such that R′ ∈
MT(R,x), ϕ(R) = ϕ(R′) = x follows from an iteration of the previous arguments (by switching
agents one by one from Ri to R′
i). Hence, ϕ is Maskin monotonic.
Corollary 2. Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Condition R2 and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN.
If ϕ is strategy-proof and non-bossy, then it is Maskin monotonic.
4 Rich Domains, Restricted Domains, and the Muller-
Satterthwaite Theorem
We now analyze which of our domains are rich and which are restricted.
4.1 Condition R1: Rich Domains
It is clear from Examples 5 and 6 that symmetric single-peaked preferences violate Condition R1.
We show below that the convex star-shaped domain is rich. Since the single-peaked preference
domain is the one-dimensional equivalent of (convex) star-shaped preferences, our result implies
that any domain larger than the single-peaked preference domain is also rich – provided that all
preferences in the domain are convex (see Example 8).
Proposition 1. The domain of convex star-shaped preferences satisﬁes Condition R1.
The following notation for star-shaped preferences is useful in the proof of Proposition 1. Let Ri
be a star-shaped preference relation and assume that xi ∈ Ai \ {p(Ri)}. Then, for all zi ∈ Ai such
that zi Ri xi there exists x′
i ∈ Ai, x′
i Ii xi and λ(Ri;xi,zi) ∈ [0,1] such that zi = λ(Ri;xi,zi)p(Ri)+
(1 − λ(Ri;xi,zi))x′
i. Note that if λ(Ri;xi,zi) = 0, then zi Ii xi and if λ(Ri;xi,zi) = 1, then
zi = p(Ri) Pi xi.
Proof. Let Ri be a convex star-shaped preference relation and assume that x,y ∈ A such that
y Pi x. In order to verify Condition R1 we construct convex star-shaped preferences R′
i such that
y ∈ b(R′
i) and L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x). If yi = p(Ri) then we are done by choosing R′
i = Ri. Thus, we
assume that yi  = p(Ri).
Loosely speaking, we construct R′
i by “lifting yi up” to become the peak of a new preference
relation R′
i such that preferences over L(Ri,x) do not change. To be more precise, we construct
preferences R′
i as follows:
(i) yi = p(R′
i), i.e., yi is the peak of R′
i;
(ii) for all z,z′ ∈ L(Ri,x), zRiz′ if and only if zR′
iz′, i.e., preferences on L(Ri,x) do not change;
13(iii) for all z ∈ U(Ri,x) and z′ ∈ SL(Ri,x), zP′
iz′, i.e., preferences between U(Ri,x) and SL(Ri,x)
do not change;
(iv) for all z,z′ ∈ U(Ri,x), z R′
i z′ if and only if λ(R′
i;xi,zi) ≥ λ(R′
i;xi,z′
i), i.e., we parameterize
all z,z′ ∈ U(Ri,x) using line segments from the indiﬀerence set Ii(Ri,xi) = {x′
i ∈ Ai : x′
iIixi}
to the peak p(R′
i) = yi and λ(R′
i;xi, ).
Note that by (i) and (iv), b(R′
i) = {y} and by (ii), L(Ri,x) = L(R′
i,x) (in particular, Ii(Ri,xi) =
Ii(R′
i,xi)). Next, we prove that convex star-shapedness is preserved by our construction of R′
i
from Ri.
First, we show that star-shapedness is preserved when going from Ri to R′
i. Let w,z ∈ A and
λ ∈ (0,1) be such that wi,zi ∈ Ai \ {p(R′
i)} and zi = λyi + (1 − λ)wi. We prove that zi P′
i wi. We
have two cases to consider:
Case 1. w ∈ SL(Ri,x)
Hence, (a) w,z ∈ SL(Ri,x) or (b) [w ∈ SL(Ri,x) and z ∈ U(Ri,x)]. For (a), since yi Pi wi, by
convexity, zi Ri wi. Suppose, by contradiction, that zi Ii wi. Since, yi Pi wi there exists w′ ∈ A
with w′
i Ii wi and such that yi = ¯ λp(Ri) + (1 − ¯ λ)w′
i for some ¯ λ ∈ (0,1). If w′
i = wi or w′
i = zi,
then we are done.12 So suppose that w′
i is distinct from wi and zi. Since zi = λwi + (1 − λ)yi and
yi = ¯ λp(Ri) + (1 − ¯ λ)w′
i, we obtain
zi = λwi + (1 − λ)[¯ λp(Ri) + (1 − ¯ λ)w′
i] = λwi + (1 − λ)(1 − ¯ λ)w′
i + (1 − λ)¯ λp(Ri).
Let v ∈ A be such that vi is the following convex combination of wi, w′
i, and zi:
vi = λwi + (1 − λ)(1 − ¯ λ)w′
i + (1 − λ)¯ λzi.
By convexity, vi Ri zi Ii wi Ii w′
i. Notice that zi − (1 − λ)¯ λp(Ri) = vi − (1 − λ)¯ λzi. Therefore,
zi =
1
(1 + (1 − λ)¯ λ)
vi +
(1 − λ)¯ λ
(1 + (1 − λ)¯ λ)
p(Ri) = ˜ λvi + (1 − ˜ λ)p(Ri)
with ˜ λ = 1
(1+(1−λ)¯ λ) ∈ (0,1). Hence, by star-shapedness of Ri, zi Pi vi, contradicting vi Ri zi.
Therefore, zi Pi wi and by the construction of R′
i (see (ii)), it follows that zi P′
i wi.
For (b), w ∈ SL(Ri,x), z ∈ U(Ri,x), and the construction of R′
i (see (iii)) imply zi P′
i wi.
Case 2. w ∈ U(Ri,xi)
Hence, by the convex star-shapedness of Ri, zi Pi wi and z ∈ SU(Ri,xi). Thus, λ(R′
i;xi,zi) >
λ(R′
i;xi,wi). Hence, by construction of R′
i (see (iv)), this implies zi P′
i wi.
Second, we show that convexity is preserved when going from Ri to R′
i. Instead of the standard
deﬁnition of convex preferences given in Footnote 9, it is well-known that convexity of preferences
can be deﬁned via the convexity of upper contour sets. Recall that we do not change preferences
on L(Ri,x). An immediate implication is that for each y′ ∈ L(R′
i,x), U(R′
i,y′) is a convex set.
12If w
′
i = wi or w
′
i = zi, then for some λ
∗ ∈ (0,1), zi = λ
∗wi + (1 − λ
∗)p(Ri) and by star-shapedness, zi Pi wi.
14Therefore, to show our claim, we only need to consider upper contour sets for points that are in
SU(Ri,x). Hence, let v,w ∈ SU(R′
i,x), v  = w, vI′
iw, and α ∈ (0,1) such that zi = αvi+(1−α)wi.
We have to show that z R′
i v I′
i w. By construction of R′






Note that v,w ∈ SU(R′
i,x) and v  = w imply that 1 > λ(R′
i;xi,vi) = λ(R′
i;xi,wi) > 0.
Let ˆ zi = αv′
i+(1−α)w′
i. There exist v′,w′,z′ ∈ A such that v′
iIiw′
iIiz′
iIixi (recall that Ii(Ri,xi) =
Ii(R′
i,xi)), vi = λ(R′
i;xi,vi)yi+(1−λ(R′
i;xi,vi))v′




ˆ zi = λ(R′
i;xi, ˆ zi)yi + (1 − λ(R′
i;xi, ˆ zi))z′
i. By convexity, ˆ z R′
i v′ I′
i w′. By construction of R′
i (see
(iv)), λ(R′





Next, we can derive zi = [λ(R′
i;xi,vi) + λ(R′
i;xi, ˆ zi) − λ(R′
i;xi,vi)λ(R′




i.13 Since, zi = λ(R′
i;xi,zi)yi + (1 − λ(R′
i;xi,zi))z′






i;xi, ˆ zi). Hence, 1 > λ(R′
i;xi,vi) > 0 and
λ(R′
i;xi, ˆ zi) ≥ 0 imply
⇔ λ(R′




i;xi, ˆ zi) − λ(R′
i;xi,vi)λ(R′
i;xi, ˆ zi) ≥ 0
⇔ λ(R′
i;xi,vi) + λ(R′
i;xi, ˆ zi) − λ(R′
i;xi,vi)λ(R′





Hence, the desired inequality (1) holds and we have proven convexity of the preference relation
R′
i.
Corollary 3. Let A such that for all i ∈ N, Ai ⊆ Rm and F be given. Let R be the domain of all
convex star-shaped preferences and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN. If ϕ is Maskin monotonic, then it
is strategy-proof.
The following example demonstrates that convexity of preferences is a necessary assumption for
star-shaped preferences to satisfy Condition R1.
Example 8. Let A = [0,1]2 × ... × [0,1]2 and let R be the domain of star-shaped preferences. In
Figure 2, we depict a preference relation Ri on Ai = R2
+ with peak p(Ri) and with a non-convex
upper contour set at xi ∈ Ai (marked by the indiﬀerence curve through xi). It is easy to see that
there does not exist R′
i ∈ R with yi = p(R′
i) and L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x). Indeed, for any such R′
i,
star-shapedness implies that for all z′ ∈ A with z′
i = zi, z ∈ SU(R′
i,x) while Condition R1 implies
that z ∈ L(R′
i,x); a contradiction. Thus Condition R1 is violated. ⋄
13For completeness, zi = αvi + (1 − α)wi = α[λ(R
′
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Figure 2: Star-shaped non-convex preferences that do not satisfy Condition R1
4.2 Condition R2: Restricted Domains
It is clear from Examples 3 and 4 that general single-peaked preferences violate Condition R2. We
show below that all preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm satisfy R2.
Proposition 2. The domain of preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm satisﬁes
Condition R2.14
Proof. Let       be a strictly convex norm and Ri,R′
i be preferences on Ai ⊆ Rm induced by      .
Furthermore, let x ∈ A be such that R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x) and R′
i  = Ri. Note that then p(Ri)  = p(R′
i).
Let y ∈ L(Ri,x) ∩ U(R′
i,x). Since R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x), y ∈ L(R′
i,x) ∩ U(R′
i,x). Hence, yi I′
i xi and
 p(R′
i) − yi  =  p(R′
i) − xi . (2)
Furthermore, y ∈ L(Ri,x) implies
 p(Ri) − yi  ≥  p(Ri) − xi . (3)
Consider line(p(Ri),p(R′
i)) = {zi ∈ Rm : there exists t ∈ R such that zi = txi + (1 − t)yi}. Then,
there exist two distinct points ˆ zi, ˜ zi ∈ line(p(Ri),p(R′
i)) such that ˆ zi Ii xi and ˜ zi Ii xi (possibly
ˆ zi = xi or ˜ zi = xi). Note that we can give an orientation to the line such that one of these points is
to the left of p(Ri) and the other is to the right of p(Ri). Without loss of generality, assume that
p(R′
i) and ˜ zi are to the right of p(Ri). Since R′
i ∈ MT(Ri,x), ˜ zi Ii xi implies ˜ zi ∈ L(R′
i,x) and
 p(R′
i) − ˜ zi  ≥  p(R′
i) − xi . (4)
Case 1. p(R′
i)  ∈ conv(p(Ri), ˜ zi)
Then,  p(Ri) − p(R′
i)  >  p(Ri) − ˜ zi  =  p(Ri) − xi . Hence, p(R′




i,x). Hence, xi = p(R′
i) and by (2), xi = yi.
14Note that then any subdomain satisﬁes Condition R2 as well.
16Case 2. p(R′
i) ∈ conv(p(Ri), ˜ zi)
Then, by strict convexity,  p(Ri) − ˜ zi  =  p(Ri) − p(R′
i)  +  p(R′
i) − ˜ zi 
(4)
≥  p(Ri) − p(R′
i)  +
 p(R′
i) − xi 
(∗)
≥  p(Ri) − xi , where (∗) follows from the triangular inequality. However, since
 p(Ri) − ˜ zi  =  p(Ri) − xi , (∗) is an equality and by strict convexity, p(R′
i) ∈ conv(p(Ri),xi).
Hence, xi = ˜ zi.
If p(R′
i)  ∈ conv(p(Ri),yi), then, by strict convexity,  p(Ri) − yi  <  p(Ri) − p(R′






i)−xi  =  p(Ri)−xi . Thus,  p(Ri)−yi  <  p(Ri)−xi ; contradicting
(3). Hence, p(R′
i) ∈ conv(p(Ri),yi). But then, (2) and (3) together imply, xi = yi.
To summarize, we have proven that for any y ∈ L(Ri,x)∩U(R′
i,x), it follows that yi = xi. Hence,
preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm satisfy Condition R2.
Examples of preferences induced by a strictly convex norm for Ai = Rm are symmetric (Eu-
clidean) and separable quadratic preferences.
Corollary 4. Let A such that for all i ∈ N, Ai ⊆ Rm and F be given. Let R be a domain of
preferences that are induced by a strictly convex norm and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN.
(a) If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is unilaterally monotonic.
(b) Let F determine a public goods economy. If ϕ is strategy-proof, then it is Maskin monotonic.
We provide in Table 1 a summary of the results obtained so far. We now turn our attention to
the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem and its extensions.
Preference Domain Condition R1 Condition R2
Arrovian preferences Yes Yes
strict single-peaked preferences on R Yes Yes
left-right single-peaked preferences on R Yes Yes
right-left single-peaked preferences on R Yes Yes
symmetric single-peaked (Euclidean) preferences on Rm No Yes
separable quadratic preferences on Rm No Yes
convex norms induced preferences on Rm No Yes
single-peaked preferences on R Yes No
single-peaked preferences on R with an outside option Yes No
single-plateaued preferences on R Yes No
DHM single-plateaued preferences on R Yes No
convex star-shaped preferences on Rm Yes No
star-shaped preferences on Rm No No
Table 1: Preference Domains and Conditions R1 and R2
174.3 An Extended Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem
To conclude the section, we now state some immediate consequences of Theorems 1 and 2, and
Corollaries 1 and 2.
Theorem 3. An Extension of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem
Let A and F be given. Let R satisfy Conditions R1 and R2 and let rule ϕ be deﬁned on RN.
(a) Then, ϕ is unilaterally monotonic if and only if it is strategy-proof.
(b) Let F determine a public goods economy. Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is
strategy-proof.
(c) Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy.
Theorem 3 states an extension of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem that covers both the public
goods and the private goods case. Items (a) and (c) establish that the only monotonicity condition
equivalent to strategy-proofness in a private goods model is the unilateral monotonicity condition.
As Corollary 2 made clear, for domains satisfying both R1 and R2, only a subset of the set of
strategy-proof rules coincide with the set of Maskin monotonic rules, namely the set of strategy-
proof rules that satisfy non-bossiness. Because non-bossiness is vacuous in public goods models,
item (c) directly implies item (b). The equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-
proofness as stated in the original version of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem can thus be obtained
only for public goods models.
Corollary 5. The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem
Let A and F be given such that F determines a public goods economy. Let rule ϕ be deﬁned on the
Arrovian domain RA. Then, ϕ is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is strategy-proof.
Next, we show that the conclusion of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem is not only limited to
the Arrovian domain; Theorem 3 has bite for various single-peaked preference domains. A ﬁrst
example is the domain of strict single-peaked preferences on R or the domain of strict single-peaked
preferences deﬁned on a ﬁnite set of alternatives. Indeed, preferences being single-peaked implies
Condition R1 and preferences being strict implies Condition R2.
Finally, we introduce a new “Muller-Satterthwaite domain”. Suppose that a public facility, e.g.,
a phone booth is to be located on a street that is very safe on one end of the street and becomes
more and more dangerous when moving towards the other end of the street. Then, it is natural to
assume that agents’ preferences are single-peaked (the phone booth in front of one’s house would
be best) and prefer any location in the safer part of the street to a location in the more dangerous
part of the street. The following preference domain describes the situation when the street is very
safe on its “left side” and becomes more dangerous towards its “right side”.15
15We thank Bernardo Moreno for suggesting this type of preference domain.
18Left-right single-peaked preferences on R: Preferences Ri on Ai ⊆ R are left-right single-
peaked if Ri is single-peaked on R with peak p(Ri) ∈ Ai and such that for all xi,yi ∈ Ai satisfying
xi ≤ p(Ri) < yi, xi Pi yi.
Note that any left-right single-peaked preference relation is uniquely deﬁned by its peak.
Proposition 3. Left-right single-peaked preferences satisfy Conditions R1 and R2.
Proof. Note that the domain of left-right single-peaked preferences only contains strict preferences
and therefore satisﬁes Condition R2. In order to verify Condition R1, let Ri be a left-right single-
peaked preference relation and assume that x,y ∈ A such that y Pi x. Consider the left-right
single-peaked preference relation R′
i with p(R′
i) = yi. By the deﬁnition of left-right single-peaked
preferences:
(i) if xi > p(Ri), then L(Ri,x) = A ∩ [x,∞) = L(R′
i,x);
(ii) if xi ≤ p(Ri), then xi < yi ≤ p(Ri) and
L(Ri,x) = A ∩ ((−∞,x] ∪ [p(Ri)
1,∞)) ⊆ A ∩ ((−∞,x] ∪ [y,∞)) = L(R′
i,x).
Hence, y ∈ b(R′
i) and L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x). Thus, the domain of left-right single-peaked preferences
also satisﬁes Condition R1.
Similarly, we can deﬁne the domain of right-left single-peaked preferences on R by assuming
that the street is very safe on its “right side” and becomes more dangerous towards its “left side”.
A Appendix: Richness Conditions
First, we introduce Dasgupta et al.’s (1979) richness condition. A domain is (Dasgupta, Hammond,
and Maskin) rich if it satisﬁes the following condition.
Condition DHM: Let Ri,R′
i ∈ R and a,b ∈ A such that (a) aRib ⇒ aR′
ib and (b) aPib ⇒ aP′
i b.
Then, there exists R′′
i ∈ R such that (i) R′′
i ∈ MT(Ri,a) and (ii) R′′
i ∈ MT(R′
i,b).
Maskin (1985) called the Dasgupta et al. (1979) rich domain monotonically closed. Note that
Condition DHM does not imply Condition R1. For instance, strictly monotonic domains satisfying
Condition DHM do not satisfy Condition R1.16 On the other hand, all the domains satisfying
Condition R1 that we look at in the paper satisfy Condition DHM.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1997) also use a domain richness condition under the name of strict
monotonic closedness. Their rich domain satisﬁes the following condition.
Condition FM: Let Ri,R′
i ∈ R and a,b ∈ A such that (a) aPi b. Then, there exists R′′
i ∈ R such
that for all c ∈ A, c  = a,b, (i) a R′
i c implies a P′′
i c, (ii) b Ri c implies b P′′
i c, and (iii) [not a I′′
i b].
16A domain R is strictly monotonic with respect to Ai, |Ai| = ∞, if for each Ri ∈ R, and each xi,yi ∈ Ai with
yi > xi, yi Pi xi
19Note that Conditions R1 and FM are logically independent. The domain of single-plateaued
preferences on R is rich according to Condition R1, but not according to Condition FM (on the
single-plateaued domain it might not be possible to satisfy Condition FM(iii)). On the other hand,
strictly monotonic domains satisfying Condition FM do not satisfy Condition R1.
Finally we consider Le Breton and Zaporozhets’s (2009) rich domain condition.
Condition LBZ: Let Ri ∈ R and x,y ∈ A such that y Pi x and y ∈ b( ¯ Ri) for some ¯ Ri ∈ R, there
exists R′
i ∈ R such that y ∈ b(R′
i) and for all z with zi  = xi such that x Ri z, x P′
i z.
While Condition LBZ implies Condition R1, the converse is not true. Observe that Condition
LBZ requires that L(Ri,x) \ {x} ⊆ SL(R′
i,x); a stronger requirement than L(Ri,x) ⊆ L(R′
i,x)
imposed by Condition R1. Condition LBZ requires suﬃcient degrees of freedom to undo at R′
i the
possible indiﬀerences with respect to x present at Ri. On the other hand, all the domains satisfying
Condition R1 that we look at in the paper satisfy Condition LBZ.
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